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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Donald Britton contends that the traffic stop in this case was unlawfully prolonged
because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to extend the scope of the stop and conduct
a DUI investigation. The State's response tries to force this case to fit under the decision in
State v. Grigg, 149 Idaho 361 (Ct. App. 2010), by evaluating only two of the relevant factors in a

vacuum. When the totality of the circumstances is properly considered, this case is actually
more like the Supreme Court's recent decision in State v. Gonzales, 165 Idaho 667, _ , 450
P.3d 315, 321-22 (2019), which the State's brief does not so much as mention. As such, just as
in Gonzales, this Court should reject the State's argument and reverse the order denying
Mr. Britton's motion to suppress.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Britton's Appellant's Brief

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Britton's motion to suppress because the
officer did not have reasonable suspicion to justify deviation from the mission of the traffic stop.

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Britton's Motion To Suppress Because The Officer
Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To Justify Deviation From The Mission Of The Traffic
Stop
The critical question in cases like this is whether there is sufficient information known to
the officer which create a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. State v. Gonzales, 165
Idaho 667, _ , 450 P.3d 315, 321 (2019) (holding there was no reasonable suspicion where the
officer "never articulated what criminal suspicion he had of [the defendant's] behavior")
(emphasis from original); accord State v. Kelley, 160 Idaho 761, 764 (Ct. App. 2016) (holding
there was no reasonable suspicion because "[t]he officer did not testify to any facts connecting
[the defendant's] nervous behavior with criminal activity."). "Not every suspicious or abnormal
behavior is sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion." Gonzales, 450 P.3d at 321.
This means that, while the factors need not always be cast in their most innocent light,
neither must they always be cast in their most damning light. The question "'is not whether
particular conduct is 'innocent' or 'guilty,' but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular
types of noncriminal acts."' Gonzales, 450 P.3d at 321-22 (quoting United States v. Sokolow,
490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989)). The more closely tied the noncriminal conduct is to potential criminal
conduct, the more likely it is to create reasonable suspicion. See id.; Kelley, 160 Idaho at 764.
However, in cases like this, where the noncriminal conduct is actually distanced from potential
criminal conduct because of the officer's other specific observations, it does not create a
reasonable suspicion. See Gonzales, 450 P .3d at 322.
The State's argument under Grigg fails to comport with this fundamental principle of
search-and-seizure law because it considers the bloodshot eyes and the exaggerated, tweaking
motions in a vacuum, rather than in the totality of the circumstances. Even Grigg, read properly,
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does not support the State's argument in that regard. The reason there was reasonable suspicion
in Grigg is that the combination of factors observed by the officer - bloodshot eyes along with a
reddening of the conjunctiva of the eyes and eyelid tremors - was tied directly to recent drug use.
Id.

In this case, Officer Klitch actually testified that he specifically looked for that sort of

additional factor that would indicate recent drug use - injection marks, raised taste buds, or white
coating on the tongue - and admitted that he did not see any such indicators on Mr. Britton.
(Tr., p.109, L.9 - p.110, L.6.) Therefore, far from being controlled by the conclusion in Grigg,
this case is actually distinguishable from Grigg.
Rather, this case is much more like Gonzales in terms of the evaluation of the totality of
the circumstances. In Gonzales, as here, none of the factors observed was sufficient, by itself, to
create reasonable suspicion. See Grigg, 149 Idaho at 364 (reaffirming that bloodshot eyes do not
independently give rise to reasonable suspicion); State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 919, 924 (Ct. App.
2016) (reaffirming that nervous or exaggerated motions are "of limited significance in
establishing the presence of reasonable suspicion"); accord Kelley, 160 Idaho at 762-63 (same as
Neal).

More importantly, considered together and in the totality of all the relevant

circumstances, they still did not create reasonable suspicion of criminal, as opposed to simply
abnormal behavior. Id. at 321-22. The State's argument does not account for Gonzales, as the
State did not so much as mention the Idaho Supreme Court's most recent opinion in this area of
the law in its Respondent's Brie£ 1 (See generally Resp. Br.)
As in Gonzales, the rest of the totality of the circumstances do not sufficiently tie the
potentially abnormal behavior to potential criminal conduct. Notably, in addition to expressly
not seeing any indicators of recent drug use (injection marks, raised taste buds, white coating on
1

Gonzales was issued one month after Mr. Britton filed his appellant's brief, some two months
before the State filed its response. See Gonzales, 450 P .3d 315 (opinion filed October 7, 2019).
4

the tongue), Officer Klitch also indicated that the way Mr. Britton responded to his questions did
not give him any indication that Mr. Britton was under the influence. (See Tr., p.110, L.12 p.111, L.2 (testifying that Mr. Britton was not giving incorrect answers, forgetting answers, or
repeating answers).) The video of the stop bears that out (see generally Exhibit 1), showing that
Compare, e.g., State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300,

Mr. Britton was not slurring his speech either.

302-03 (2007) (holding that bloodshot eyes along with the smell of an alcoholic beverage,
slurred speech, and an observed pattern of erratic driving created reasonable suspicion of DUI),
overruled on other grounds; Thompson v. State, 138 Idaho 512, 515 (Ct. App. 2003). The video

also shows that there was no pattern of erratic driving prior to the stop. (See generally Exhibit
1.) Finally, Mr. Britton had his dog in the car and it was apparently active enough that it needed
at least some attention from Mr. Britton, which would potentially explain the exaggerated or
twitchy movements. 2 (See Exhibit 1, ~8:04:50.) The State's argument addresses none of these

2

In fact, the video of the stop actually undermines the officer's testimony about whether the
nervous or tweaking behaviors were present in the first place. For example, Officer Klitch
testified that those behaviors were most evident during the walk-and-tum test, as Mr. Britton was
constantly moving and reaching around with his arms during that test. (Tr., p.97, L.25 - p.98,
L.5.) However, the video disproves the officer's testimony on that point, as it clearly shows that
Mr. Britton's hands remained at his sides during the walk-and-tum test except when he put them
out to maintain his balance. (Exhibit 1, ~8:13:55-8:15:31.) Moreover, the video shows that
Mr. Britton did not display any exaggerated or tweaking movements while getting out of the car
or in reacting to the officer's warning to make sure his dog stayed in the car. (See Exhibit 1,
~8:05:00.) Thus, if such behaviors were present, they certainly did not rise to the level where
they gave a reasonable suspicion (as opposed to an inchoate hunch) of criminal conduct.
Compare Gonzales, 450 P.3d at 322.
Although these facts bring the officer's credibility into question, Mr. Britton recognizes
that they occurred after the officer had expanded the scope of the stop, and so, are not,
themselves, directly relevant to evaluating whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to
prolong the stop. See, e.g., State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009) (reiterating that
reasonable suspicion is determined by the factors known to the officer at or before the time of the
detention at issue). Still, the fact that the officer may have misremembered certain points about
the relevant facts, particularly when his testimony is contradicted by the video, is a valid
consideration. Compare State v. Page, 2020 WL 241570 (Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2020) (reversing an
order denying a motion to suppress because the video contradicted the officers' testimony about
5

other factors.

(See generally Resp. Br.) That silence is telling because each of these other

factors reduces the degree to which the two otherwise-innocuous factors to which the State
points can be reasonably connected to potential criminal conduct. Compare Gonzales, 450 P.3d
at 321-22. More importantly, the combined impact of those factors show, just as in Gonzales
and Kelley, there was no reasonable, articulated connection in the totality of the circumstances.
Since the State's argument is not based on an evaluation of the totality of the
circumstances, but rather, on the evaluation two cherry-picked factors considered in a vacuum,
this Court should reject that argument. An evaluation of the actual totality of the circumstances
known to the officer at the time he prolonged the stop shows that he did not have a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity, and therefore, the prolonged stop was unconstitutional.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Britton respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order of
judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress.
DATED this 11 th day of February, 2020.

Isl Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

the facts upon which they claimed to have reasonable suspicion), not yet final; see also Staff of
Idaho Real Estate Comm 'n v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 634 (2001) (reaffirming that citing an
unpublished opinion only as a historical example, not as binding precedent (as Mr. Britton has
done here), "was appropriate.").
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